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DUE PROCESS IN THE AMERICAN IDENTITY 
Cassandra Burke Robertson∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In the last four years, public opinion polls have found an increasingly 
high level of public support for the methods applied in the war on terror. A 
significant majority of the population now expresses support for targeted 
killing through drone strikes and for the indefinite detention of suspected 
terrorists at Guantánamo Bay. While there are undoubtedly many 
dynamics at play in the public’s changing views of national security and 
due process, this Article examines one piece of the puzzle: how the concept 
of due process fits within the structure of the American identity. 
This Article examines due process and national security through the 
lens of social psychology, and its approach helps to shed light on how and 
why public opinion has changed. It opens by contrasting the doctrinal view 
of due process as a legal principle with an opposing view of due process as 
an expression of American values, and it concludes that both views can 
give rise to similar policy choices—but for fundamentally different reasons. 
The Article then applies two related theories from social psychology to 
explore how people’s views of due process interact with their national 
identity to create support for different policy choices. Finally, it argues that 
separating these strands in the public debate on the war on terror can 
facilitate the conscious consideration of our national identity. In turn, this 
explicit recognition of the intertwining of identity and policy can create the 
opportunity to intentionally shape national identity. In order to do so, 
however, we must broaden the discussion beyond the legality of national 
security policies—or even their instrumental value—and move the 
discussion into an examination of more fundamental questions of who we 
are as a nation and who we want to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
∗   Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. For helpful inspiration, 
discussions, and suggestions, I thank Jonathan Adler, Peter Burke, Jonathan Entin, Amos N. Guiora, 
Jessie Hill, Sharona Hoffman, Jacqui Lipton, Peter Margulies, Thom Robertson, Michael Scharf, Mano 
Singham, Johanna Staral, Jan Stets, and Bob Strassfeld. 
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Roy: Our studies indicate the weapon is totally useless in warfare. 
David Decker: It’s not intended for use in your kind of warfare, Roy. 
It’s the perfect peacetime weapon. That’s why it’s secret. 
Man: So it’s both immoral and unethical? 
David Decker: Yes. [laughter]1 
 
“We needed a court order to eavesdrop on him, . . . but we didn’t need 
a court order to kill him. Isn’t that something?”2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, the heroes of teenage caper movie Real Genius foiled CIA 
plans to develop a weapon capable of “laser-zap[ping] specific targets from 
outer space”—a weapon described as “eerily similar” to the Predator 
drones in use today.3 From the opening scenes, the movie made it clear to 
 
1. REAL GENIUS (Columbia TriStar 1985). 
2. Doyle McManus, Who Reviews the U.S. ‘Kill List’?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at A24, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/05/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-drones-and-the-
law-20120205. 
3. Elizabeth Wilcox, It’s a Moral Imperative, A BRIGHT WALL IN A DARK ROOM, 
http://brightwalldarkroom.tumblr.com/post/10486272238/real-genius-1985 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
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the viewer that the architects of the weapon were villains: they laughed 
over the idea that they were creating “the perfect peacetime weapon” that 
was “both immoral and unethical,” and they threatened colleagues who 
expressed reservations about the idea of targeted killing.  
Twenty-seven years later, however, the idea of targeted killing through 
drone strikes is no longer just the purview of movie villains. Drone strikes 
have become a key part of America’s counterterrorism initiative; during the 
second year of the Obama presidency, the United States conducted 111 
drone strikes in Pakistan—significantly more than had been authorized 
during the Bush years.4  In some strikes, a particular terrorist leader is 
targeted; other times, however, a so-called “signature strike” or “crowd 
killing” is used to target “groups of men who bear certain signatures, or 
defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose 
identities aren’t necessarily known.”5 
Targeted killing has also gained support with the American public. The 
United States President has gone on record as supporting the “judicious” 
use of drones as an alternative to conventional warfare,6 and 83% of 
Americans approve of that policy.7 Even when the drone target is an 
American citizen living abroad, support declines only modestly; 79% still 
approve targeted killing in this scenario.8 This level of public support 
proved surprising to those who object to extrajudicial killing, especially to 
those troubled by the death of a sixteen-year-old American citizen, born in 
Denver, Colorado, and “killed when one of his country’s drones hit him 
and a number of other people in Yemen.”9 
Current public support for targeted killing appears to reflect a larger 
change in attitudes toward due process and national security.10 It is 
mirrored by a shift in public opinion about the indefinite detention of 
suspected terrorists, as 70% of Americans have grown to support the 
 
4. DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA 
PRESIDENCY 117 (2012). 
5. Id. at 41. 
6. David Jackson, Obama Defends Drone Strikes, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2012, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/01/obama-defends-drone-strikes/1. 
7. Washington Post–ABC News Poll, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postabcpoll_020412.html. 
8. Id. 
9. Amy Davidson, An American Teen-ager in Yemen, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2011/10/an-american-teen-ager-in-yemen.html. 
10. Of course, the current shift is part of a larger historical framework in which support for 
procedural due process has at times given way to a perceived need for greater security. See. e.g., Micah 
Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of Terrorism? Procedural Due Process in the 
Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 685, 703 (2002) (“From its inception, America 
has a history of security outweighing liberty in times of national crisis.”); Sarah A. Whalin, National 
Security Versus Due Process: Korematsu Raises Its Ugly Head Sixty Years Later in Hamdi and Padilla, 
22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 711, 711 (2006) (“During times of war, this balance tends to shift in favor of 
national security”). 
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continued operation of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility11—a 
significant departure from the 39% who wanted to keep it open at the time 
President Obama took office.12 It is also preceded by an earlier shift in the 
number of people who believed that torture could sometimes be 
justifiable.13 Each of these policies—targeted killing, detention without 
judicial review in the civilian courts, and “enhanced interrogation,” or 
torture—represents a limitation on the traditional scope of procedural due 
process normally found in civil and criminal proceedings.14  
Commentators have offered different explanations for the shift in 
public opinion. Some have suggested that the American population is 
falling in line with policy decisions imposed from above.15 Others have 
suggested that instead of shaping public opinion, Congress and the 
President are instead following the popular will.16 Likewise, observers 
disagree about what the shift means: are people abandoning ideals of due 
process in favor of a more expedient policy choice,17 or are they supporting 
these policies because they believe that current incarceration and targeted 
killing policies have already incorporated a high level of due process?18 
There are undoubtedly many dynamics at play in the public’s changing 
views of national security and due process. This Article examines one piece 
of the puzzle: how the concept of due process fits within the structure of 
 
11. See ABC News Poll, supra note 7. 
12. Pew Research Center, Obama Faces Familiar Divisions over Anti-Terror Policies, PEW RES. 
CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1125/terrorism-
Guantanamo-torture-polling. 
13. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural 
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2009) (“Between 2005 and 
2009—a period of time well after the 9/11 attacks—the percentage of Americans who ‘believed torture 
was at least sometimes justifiable’ rose from thirty-eight percent to fifty-two percent.”); see also David 
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2005) (“Torture used to 
be incompatible with American values.”). 
14. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7 
(2006) (noting that procedural due process in civil litigation is based on the “premise that notice and a 
hearing should precede liberty or property deprivations” and that procedural due process in criminal 
cases focuses on the trial itself, offering fewer pretrial due process rights). 
15. Glen Greenwald, Repulsive Progressive Hypocrisy, SALON (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/02/08/repulsive_progressive_hypocrisy/singleton/ (criticizing the “blind 
loyalty” of Democrats). 
16. Jack Goldsmith, What Changed U.S. Attitudes About Counterterrorism Policies, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/counterterrorism-policies-have-been-
legitimized-by-courts-and-consensus/2012/02/13/gIQA5btbGR_story.html (arguing that President 
Obama was following the lead of Congress, which “was responding to the views of the American 
people”). 
17. See, e.g., Suzanne Ito, Targeted Killing: Death Without Due Process, ACLU BLOG OF 
RIGHTS (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/targeted-killing-death-without-due-
process. 
18. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 16 (“One reason Americans have grown more comfortable 
with Guantanamo detentions is that the detentions no longer rest on presidential unilateralism and are 
no longer legally doubtful. . . . The CIA’s drone program also has been vetted to an extraordinary 
degree.”). 
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the American identity. United States citizens have long incorporated a high 
regard for due process into their conceptions of what it means to be an 
American. However, this aspect of the American identity is not absolute. 
First, a regard for due process may give way to a perceived need for 
national preservation and self-defense.19 But second, and perhaps more 
relevant to current political discourse, there are other aspects of the 
American identity—such as an expectation of strength and authority—that 
may conflict with due process when people consider various 
counterterrorism measures. Even when due process is viewed as a moral 
value central to one’s identity, it may conflict with other aspects of the 
individual’s identity that play a greater role in shaping the person’s policy 
views. 
This Article opens a discussion of individual and national identity in 
considering public support for policies enacted in the so-called war on 
terror, including targeted killing, detention without review in the civilian 
court system, and torture or enhanced interrogation.20 Part I of this Article 
begins with an analysis of procedural due process as an American value. It 
contrasts the doctrinal analysis of procedural due process as a legal 
principle (encompassing such legal safeguards as pre- and post-deprivation 
notice and hearing, judicial review, and the systemic integrity of the 
civilian justice system) with an opposing view of due process as an 
expression of American values. It concludes that both views can give rise 
to similar policy choices—but for fundamentally different reasons. Next, 
Part II delves deeper into the expressive view of procedural due process. It 
uses two different theories from social psychology—social identity theory 
and identity theory—to explore how people’s views of due process interact 
with their national identity to create support for different policy choices. 
Finally, Part III offers a way to reframe the public dialogue over 
counterterrorism policy that accounts for both a legal conception of due 
process and an identity-based expressive conception of due process. It 
concludes that the legal doctrine can protect against the worst excesses of 
human nature that may desire to withhold process entirely from those 
perceived as the enemy, and it asserts that the expressive function of due 
process should be considered in determining whether to raise due process 
protections beyond the legal minimum as a matter of public policy. Thus, 
this Article argues in favor of explicitly recognizing both the deontological 
 
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006). 
20. Seth C. Lewis & Stephen D. Reese, What is the War on Terror? Framing Through the Eyes of 
Journalists, 86 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N Q., 85, 85 (2009) (“Whether called the war on terror, 
the war on terrorism, or the war against terrorism, . . . this frame took on ideological 
dimensions, . . . providing linguistic cover for widespread political change in the name of national 
security . . . .”). 
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and consequentialist views of due process in framing the public dialogue on 
national security. While it ultimately concludes that both views provide 
support for increasing due process protections above the constitutional 
baseline, its main goal is not to recommend specific changes in the law but, 
rather, to move the public discussion into an arena that explicitly considers 
who we are as a nation and who we want to be. 
I. DUE PROCESS AS AN AMERICAN IDEAL 
Due process is part of all functional legal systems. Enshrined in Magna 
Carta, the concept of procedural due process derives from a commitment to 
the rule of law.21 It is also a fundamental component of the United States 
Constitution, which provides that neither federal nor state governments 
may deprive an individual of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”22 But in spite of its central place in American law, the 
requirements of procedural due process have rarely captured public 
attention; details of the doctrine are often fleshed out in corners of the law 
inhabited by administrative lawyers, civil procedure professors, and tax 
professionals.23 
In the post-9/11 era, however, the requirements of procedural due 
process took on a more prominent role in public debate. A conflict between 
due process and national security—whether real or perceived—began to 
play a huge part in public discourse. Courts and scholars took a central role 
in the public discourse, examining the relationship between due process 
and national security in counterterrorism initiatives including interrogation, 
detention, and targeted killing.24 Some argued in favor of a focus on 
 
21. A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal 
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1118 (2006) (“The antecedent of ‘due process 
of law’ is ‘per legem terrae’ or ‘law of the land,’ which originates from the Magna Carta.”). 
22. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. This Article does not address the related question of 
substantive due process—that is, “whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a 
person’s life, liberty, or property.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICES 420 (1997). Other scholars have closely examined the relationship between procedure and 
substance. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013, 1092 (2008); see also Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 730 (1975). 
23. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010); 
MeadWestvaco Corp. successor in interest to Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 18–19, 
(2008); see also Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Process 
and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 592 (1998). 
24. See generally William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: 
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667 (2002); Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The 
Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981379; Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? 
Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L 
HUM. L. (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754223; Richard H. 
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security over process,25 while others favored process over security,26 and 
still others contended that due process need not conflict with robust 
national security protections.27 
Understandably, most of the legal scholarship in this area focused on 
the relationship between national security and the legal doctrine of due 
process. As a legal construct, due process protects against arbitrary action 
by the government and affords individuals a chance to be heard.28 Courts 
have interpreted the due process requirement to mean that governmental 
bodies must, at a minimum, afford “notice and a hearing” before depriving 
a person of life, liberty, or property.29 Thus, much of the national security 
discussion revolved around the question of what level of judicial process 
was constitutionally required in counterterrorism operations.30 
 
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on 
Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2107 (2007); Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 319 (2004); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional 
Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 199–200 
(2006); Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, 
and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due 
Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009); Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 343 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010); Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, The Evolution of Law 
and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 439 (2012); Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 963, 996 (2007); 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the 
Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2006). 
25. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 12 (“A recurrent theme of the book is that a nonlegal ‘law 
of necessity’ that would furnish a moral and political but not legal justification for acting in 
contravention of the Constitution may trump constitutional rights in extreme situations.”). 
26. Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution is a “Suicide Pact,” 
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287 (2011). 
27. Amos N. Guiora, Due Process and Counterterrorism, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680009; Harold Hongju Koh, 
Legal Advisor, U.S. State Department, The Obama Administration and International Law, Address at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; Eric Holder, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery 
by Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law (March 5, 2012), available 
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/text-of-the-attorney-generals-national-security-speech/ (“The 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process is ironclad, and it is essential—but, as a recent court decision 
makes clear, it does not require judicial approval before the President may use force abroad against a 
senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization with which the United States is at war—
even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen.”). 
28. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”). 
29. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies 
have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt 
that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”). 
30. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 27 (“Due process is the essence of a proper judicial process; 
denial of due process, whether in interrogation or trial, violates both the Constitution and moral 
norms.”); Murphy & Radsan, Due Process, supra note 24, at 405 (concluding that “the due process 
model . . . does not break down in the extreme context of targeted killing. Instead, it suggests useful 
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But due process is more than a legal principle; it is also a personal 
value that carries a special weight in the American identity. When people 
talk about what it means to be American, the respect for procedural rights 
is paramount. Since the nation’s founding, due process has been one of the 
“core values . . . set in stone as the nation’s lifeblood.”31 This value grew 
even stronger during both the Cold War and the civil rights struggle of the 
twentieth century: during the Cold War, judicial rhetoric contrasted our 
democratic judicial procedures with the arbitrary use of power associated 
with communist and totalitarian regimes,32 and this identification with 
procedural justice grew stronger with the civil rights movement, creating an 
associated respect for litigation as a “noble calling” and an agent of social 
change.33 In the American mind, judicial process is not merely a means by 
which we resolve individual disputes; instead, it is a mechanism by which 
we “announce to the world something about our beliefs and values and our 
sense of ourselves and our society.”34 
When it comes to public discourse over the policy choices inherent in 
national security efforts, people often talk past each other. Because due 
process is a legal term of art, many commentators focus exclusively on the 
complexities of legal doctrine in determining how to apply due process 
protections in the national security arena.35 Other commentators, however, 
ground their policy views about due process not on the legal perspective, 
but rather on a position based on questions of morality and identity—a 
 
means to control this practice and heighten accountability”). Outside of the national-security arena, 
scholars have focused more directly on the relationship between political ideology and legal 
interpretation. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 481 
(2011) (“Quite often, it appears, officials and citizens alike condemn the unlawful character of policies 
they oppose on substantive grounds, but ignore any illegalities in the policies they favor.”); Jared A. 
Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 831 
(2011) (“While originalists assert that interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning 
takes politics out of constitutional interpretation, the Tea Party movement shows that originalism can 
also function as purely political rhetoric.”). 
31. Sam Greenberg, Israel’s Identity Crisis, PENN. POL. REV. (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2011/01/israels-identity-crisis/. 
32. Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of 
Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 679 (2010); See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 
222 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1955) (referring to “psychological punishment” as a “favorite weapon of the 
secret police” in “brutalitarian regimes”). 
33. Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1976 (2004) (“Brown and the civil rights litigation movement helped create a 
renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue 
for social change. . . . [W]hether or not it is well-founded, this belief, with roots traceable to Brown and 
civil rights litigation, has endured for several generations.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 187 (1996). 
34. Robert N. Strassfeld, Responses to Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5133, 5148 
(2011). 
35. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 24. 
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fundamental belief about who they are and about what it means to be 
American.36 
Thus, when people do object to policies such as rendition or torture, 
they commonly express their objection in terms of identity, as did one 
resident who observed a local company participating in transport for 
renditions: “Our country is better than this. . . . We’re supposed to be a 
beacon of light.”37 And even when an objection is couched in terms of 
legality, it may nonetheless be founded in terms of personal values and 
identity—so, for example, when Rosie O’Donnell stated that she felt 
“upset” by the fact that Osama Bin Laden “didn’t have due process, that he 
didn’t get tried, that he wasn’t you know brought to The Hague for a war-
crime tribunal,”38 she was not criticizing specific legal doctrine. Even 
though she characterized the raid as “criminal,” her underlying concern was 
that “America may have become the type of ‘monsters’ we loathe with our 
targeted killing of Osama bin Laden.”39 It is unlikely that O’Donnell would 
have been persuaded by a well-reasoned legal argument for extrajudicial 
killing. The crux of her concern was the expressive function of due process 
and public trials—what such practices say about “our sense of ourselves 
and our society,”40 rather than the complexities of legal doctrine. 
Essentially, then, there are two competing dimensions of procedural 
due process—a formal legal doctrine and an expressive moral view. The 
legal doctrine applies a utilitarian and consequentialist41 equation to due 
process, taking an interest-balancing approach to determine what process is 
due in a particular case.42 The expressive function of due process, however, 
 
36. See Bayer, supra note 26. 
37. Joby Warrick, Ten Years Later, CIA ‘Rendition’ Program Still Divides N.C. Town, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ten-years-later-cia-
rendition-program-still-divides-nc-town/2012/01/23/gIQAwrAU2Q_story.html. 
38. Matt Schneider, Rosie O’Donnell: Without Due Process For Bin Laden, We May Be 
‘Monsters’, MEDIAITE (May, 9, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/rosie-odonnell-
without-due-process-and-trial-for-bin-laden-we-may-be-monsters/. 
39. Id. 
40. Strassfeld, supra note 34, at 5148. 
41. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1363, 1473 (2000) (“A moral theory is consequentialist if it has the same general structure as 
utilitarianism: if it evaluates actions solely in light of the world-states, or outcomes, that the actions 
produce. Utilitarianism is the specific variant of consequentialism that uses the criterion of overall well-
being to rank world-states.”) (emphasis in original); see also Stephen Patrick Hoffman, Is Torture 
Justified in Terrorism Cases?: Comparing U.S. and European Views, N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 5–6), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041556 (explaining 
consequentialist, deontological, and threshold deontological theories of torture). 
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (“We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of 
a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of 
law, and we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such 
confinement entails.”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) (“The idea that the necessary 
scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test 
for procedural adequacy in the due process context.”) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
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is essentially deontological; that is, it constitutes an “element of morality 
that cannot be captured within a consequentialist framework.”43 Under the 
expressive view, the “process that is due” cannot be defined by a cost–
benefit approach; instead, it is defined by reference to values and identity.44 
This deontological perspective asserts that “certain choices are inherently 
evil and can never be justified, even if they would bring about a good 
outcome.”45 An expressive view of the law combines national values with 
legal practice; it assumes that “legal constraints must come from the values 
that inform the constitutional order.”46 
When it comes to decisions about specific counterterrorism measures, 
there is some empirical support for the idea that people’s views accord 
more with a deontological perspective than a consequentialist one.47 And 
indeed, due process is not the only legal concept in which expressive 
functions may conflict with a utilitarian perspective. In the criminal law 
context, for example, Professor Dan Kahan has argued that a similar 
dichotomy exists in assessing criminal sanctions.48 He points out that the 
public often rejects the idea of alternative punishments beyond 
imprisonment “not because they perceive that these punishments won’t 
work or aren’t severe enough, but because they fail to express 
condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment.”49 Cass 
Sunstein has made a similar argument that applies across other areas of the 
law, including integration, capital punishment, restrictions on speech, and 
environmental protection.50 
Interestingly, the expressive function of due process can lead to 
radically different policy choices. On the one hand, individuals with a 
strongly deontological view of due process may be unwilling to sacrifice 
due process at the altar of expediency. As a result, they are unlikely to 
 
(1976)); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (“Even 
the United States Supreme Court seems to have suggested that the most basic procedural rights, notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, may be denied if the balance of interests does not favor them.”). 
43. Adler, supra note 41, at 1481. 
44. Bayer, supra note 26, at 295. 
45. Id. (quoting Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
38 n.165 (2010)). 
46. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1570 (2000). 
47. Miroslav Nincic & Jennifer Ramos, Torture in the Public Mind, 12 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 231, 
246–47 (2011) (“Whether a deontological or consequential argument was invoked, opinions remained 
stable whether or not an external threat was suggested. Perhaps counterintuitively, whether or not one is 
subject to threatening conditions, they seem to play little role in an individuals’ commitment to their 
stances on torture.”). 
48. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996). 
49. Id. 
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 
(1996) (“Many people support law because of the statements made by law, and disagreements about 
law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law.”). 
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support extrajudicial killing, indefinite detention, or enhanced interrogation 
even if it means accepting some risk—perhaps even significant risk—to 
national security.51 This view of due process is not limited either to non-
lawyers or to lawyers; members of both camps have expressed support for 
such a view.52 
On the other hand, however, an expressive view of due process could 
also cut the other way: due process could be viewed as simply too valuable 
to be expended on the undeserving. Again, such a view is fundamentally 
not a consequentialist one; it is held regardless of the actual risk to national 
security, though it cuts the other way. Under this view, due process should 
not be extended to suspects in the war on terror even when doing so would 
risk no harm to the country, and attempts to use legal process in the war on 
terror are derided as “lawfare.”53 Thus, Mitt Romney appears to take an 
expressive view of due process rather than a consequentialist one in his 
statement that “people who join al Qaeda are not entitled to rights of due 
process under our normal legal code. They are entitled instead to be treated 
as enemy combatants”54 The statement focuses on who “deserves” process 
without attention to the results. Likewise, the statement that McCain 
“supports legislation to grant due-process rights to terrorists,” was viewed 
as a “slur” in the 2008 primary when the statement was made by a Romney 
consultant.55 Congressional testimony arguing that “we can’t let [a 
suspected terrorist] use our process, our due process, our legal system as 
one of his other weapons as he carries on this fight”56 carries a strong 
metamessage57 supporting the expressive function of due process. Although 
it is couched in consequentialist terms, it does not specify what harm will 
 
51. See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 26, at 295. 
52. See id. (containing a legal scholar’s deontological argument); see also Schneider, supra note 
38 (summarizing the views of a non-lawyer celebrity commentator). 
53. Although the term “lawfare” was initially coined as a neutral term, “[c]onservative political 
pundits . . . jumped on the bandwagon by decrying as ‘lawfare’ virtually any attempt to apply the rule of 
law to the conduct of the war on terror.” Melissa A. Waters, “Lawfare” in the War on Terrorism: A 
Reclamation Project, 43 CASE. WES. RES. J. INT’L L. 327, 329 (2010). More recently, the term has been 
brought back to its more neutral meaning. Id.; see About Lawfare, LAWFARE: HARD NATIONAL 
SECURITY CHOICES, http://www.lawfareblog.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
54. Mitt Romney on Homeland Security, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.issues2000.org/2012/Mitt_Romney_Homeland_Security.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) 
(noting Mitt Romney’s statement on the War on Terror from the Fox News debate o n MLK Day in 
Myrtle Beach, S.C. on Jan. 16, 2012). 
55. David C. Morrison, Behind the Lines: Our Take on the Other Media’s Homeland Security 
Coverage, CONG. Q. HOMELAND SEC. (Jan 22, 2008). 
56. Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed 
Services, 109th Cong. 29 (2006) (statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Deputy Gen. Counsel; Dep’t of Def). 
57. See DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT’S NOT WHAT I MEANT: HOW CONVERSATIONAL STYLE 
MAKES OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS 29 (1992) (“Information conveyed by the 
meanings of words is the message. What is communicated about relationships—attitudes towards each 
other, the occasion, and what we are saying—is the metamessage. And it’s metamessages that we react 
to most strongly.”). 
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befall the nation if due process is extended, and it emphasizes the idea that 
due process is a value that is uniquely “ours.” 
In the national dialogue over security policy, the expressive view of 
due process can unexpectedly collide with the consequentialist view in 
ways that impede communication. A person with a strong deontological 
view of due process—and who values due process over security—simply 
will not be persuaded by consequentialist arguments that focus on the costs 
and benefits of due process within a legal framework, if those arguments 
support the denial of judicial process. Consequentialist arguments may be 
seen as weakening moral principles.58 At the same time, a consequentialist 
approach may in some cases support the extension of due process rights—
and in those cases, such an approach may prove equally unpersuasive to 
other people who also take a deontological view of due process but who 
view terrorism suspects as unworthy of such process. 
When participants in the national dialogue fail to recognize that others 
are taking a different view of due process—either consequentialist or 
expressive—confusion inevitably results. Thus, for example, a recent 
speech by Attorney General Eric Holder characterized calls to ban civilian 
courts from acting in terrorism cases as “baffling.”59 In consequentialist 
terms, Holder viewed the courts as critically important components of an 
effort “to incapacitate and punish those who attempt do us harm,” and 
stated that an attempt to foreclose action by civilian courts would “ignore 
reality.”60 The opposition to the use of civilian courts is less baffling, 
however, if it is not seen as a reasoned response to safety concerns but is 
instead viewed as an expressive choice. Likewise, lawyers who litigated 
detention cases at Guantánamo realized with hindsight that they had 
focused too much on the legal doctrine and too little on the political side of 
the equation, mistakenly believing in “the myth of rights”—that is, the idea 
that “if we can identify, elaborate, and secure judicial recognition of the 
legal ‘right,’ political structures and policies will adapt their behavior to the 
 
58. Peter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism: Legal Institutions in the War on Terror, 60 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 309, 312 (2006) (“Debate about the possibility of torture, including institutional devices such as 
the ‘torture warrants’ proposed by Alan Dershowitz may erode those moral intuitions, making torture 
merely one point on a spectrum of policy choices.”). 
59. Eric Holder, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric Holder at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/text-of-the-attorney-generals-national-security-speech/ (“[T]he 
calls that I’ve heard to ban the use of civilian courts in prosecutions of terrorism-related activity are so 
baffling, and ultimately are so dangerous. These calls ignore reality. And if heeded, they would 
significantly weaken—in fact, they would cripple—our ability to incapacitate and punish those who 
attempt do us harm.”). 
60. Id. 
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requirements of the law and change will follow more or less 
automatically.”61 
Given these different ways of thinking about due process, 
understanding public opinion about the war on terror becomes much more 
complicated. Professor Goldsmith may be right that some Americans, at 
least, support current counterterrorism initiatives because they are legally 
persuaded that these initiatives comply with constitutional due process.62 
And other observers may also be correct in concluding that some 
Americans value security over process and for that reason support these 
initiatives.63 But it is also likely that there is a third group of supporters—a 
group that values process but does not want to extend due process rights to 
people they view as the enemy, even when they could do so without 
harming national security.64 
Thus, even people with very different views about the nature and role 
of due process can converge in agreement on specific policy choices—and 
apparently have done so in the national security arena. The following Part 
takes a closer look at these divisions, examining how social psychology can 
help explain some of these differences and how these views are likely to be 
reflected in the policy choices made by individuals and by the larger 
society. 
II. SHAPING THE AMERICAN IDENTITY 
Separating the legal doctrine of due process from the expressive moral 
view allows a deeper examination of due process in the American identity. 
As other scholars have pointed out, a deontological view of due process “is 
ultimately also about a sense of identity”; it is a way of defining “who we 
really are.”65 As a moral construct, the concept of due process also plays a 
very large role in the American imagination and has become integrated into 
the American identity. 
 
61. Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 437 
(2011). 
62. See Goldsmith, supra note 18. 
63. See Ito, supra note 17. 
64. Of course, those who oppose current policies likely also fall into different camps: some may 
take a consequentialist view, believing that due process—and especially judicial process—could be 
broadened without significant threat to the country, while others would extend due process rights 
further in the war on terror even at some risk to national security. 
65. Nincic & Ramos, supra note 47, at 240. 
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A. Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory 
Two related sociological theories may help shed light on how due 
process interacts with both individual and group identity.66 Social identity 
theory examines how people define themselves as group members and 
categorize others according to ingroup and outgroup status.67 Identity 
theory, on the other hand, focuses on individuals’ role identities and role-
related behaviors.68 
1. Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory explores how individuals identify with larger 
groups.69 Individuals associate with a larger group based on perceived 
similarities, and group membership reinforces uniformity. Even when 
individuals do not interact directly, identifying with the group creates a 
common “ingroup” that is viewed in opposition to others who are part of 
the “outgroup.”70 While the group identity might arise from shared 
characteristics that are outside the individual’s control, shared 
characteristics alone do not create identity; instead, social identities arise 
from individuals’ self-categorization.71 So, for example, while people have 
long been able to estimate their relative financial net worth, it is only in the 
last year that the Occupy Wall Street movement has made “the 99%” a 
shared social identity.72 
 
66. Ian Long, Note, “Have You Been an Un-American?”: Personal Identification and 
Americanizing the Noncitizen Self-Concept, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 571, 589 (2008) (“In the field of social 
psychology, there are two prominent theories used to describe self-concept and explain how this 
concept of self is either altered or reinforced by one’s existence within society.”). 
67. See infra Part II.A.1. 
68. See infra Part II.A.2. 
69. See PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 118 (2009); MICHAEL A. HOGG & 
DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
AND GROUP PROCESSES 172 (1988). 
70. BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 118; HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 69, at 172. 
71. See Marilynn Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, in 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS, 245, 247 (Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 2001) (“Membership 
may be voluntary or imposed, but social identities are chosen. Individuals may recognize that they 
belong to any number of social groups without adopting those classifications as social identities.”); see 
also John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15 (Henri Tajfel ed. 1982) (“[A] social group can be defined as two or more 
individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category.”); Catherine E. Smith, The Group 
Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 71 (2006) (“The individual chooses 
specific ‘social categories’ with which he identifies and places himself . . . .”). 
72. See Jordan Cooper, A “Post-Social” View of Occupy Wall Street, JORDAN COOPER’S BLOG: 
STARTUPS, VENTURE CAPITAL, HYPERPUBLIC (Oct. 22, 2011), http://jordancooper.wordpress.com/ 
2011/10/22/a-post-social-view-of-occupy-wall-street/ (“There is a social identity that has formed 
around acceptance of Occupy Wall Street, and it has roots in much more generic empathy toward 
concepts of protest, and movement, and change in general.”). 
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The shared group identity increases members’ self-esteem. Members 
have categorized themselves on factors they value. By defining the ingroup 
this way—and by contrasting it to an outgroup that lacks the valued 
characteristic—group members “judge their group positively and the 
outgroup negatively, thereby raising their evaluation of themselves as 
ingroup members.”73 As a result, group members develop an increasingly 
favorable perception of the ingroup and a less favorable perception of the 
outgroup.74 
In addition to influencing group member’s views of the outgroup, the 
emphasis on belonging and group identity also diminishes the focus on the 
individual. Group members de-emphasize their individual differences and 
inclinations, focusing instead on creating and adopting shared norms within 
the group.75 This “process of depersonalization” views others not as 
“idiosyncratic individual[s]” but instead as “more or less prototypical 
member[s] of an ingroup or an outgroup.”76 While this process is a natural 
byproduct of group identification, it may also heighten the risk that groups 
will engage in counterproductive stereotyping of the outgroup.77 
2. Identity Theory 
In contrast to social identity theory’s focus on “group processes and 
intergroup relations,” identity theory emphasizes “individuals’ role-related 
 
73. BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 120–21 (“For example, if the ingroup consists of members 
of the military, the value of ‘serving one’s country’ would benefit the members of the ingroup and 
degrade the value of outgroup members who do not share this value. Knowing that members of the 
ingroup share this value makes the ingroup more attractive to ingroup members and makes one glad to 
be a member.”). 
74. Michael Hogg, Social Identity and Misuse of Power: The Dark Side of Leadership, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2005) (“Since the groups and categories we belong to furnish us with a 
social identity that defines and evaluates who we are, we struggle to promote and protect the 
distinctiveness and evaluative positivity of our own group relative to other groups.”). 
75. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social 
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 826 n.196 (2007); Michael A. Hogg & Barbara A. 
Mullin, Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group 
Identification, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 249, 254 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. 
Hogg eds., 1999). 
76. Hogg, supra note 74, at 1242; BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 124 (“Depersonalization 
does not mean that one loses his or her personal identity; rather, there is simply a change in focus from 
the individual to the group. In social identity theory, because the personal identity and the social 
identity are mutually exclusive bases of self-definitions, both are unlikely to be operating at the same 
time.”). 
77. Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and Social Identity, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 931, 963 (2010) 
(“Although this process, if taken too far, can lead to stereotyping and deep mistrust of outside groups, it 
is also a crucial ingredient in developing the self-esteem necessary for a healthy sense of self.”); see 
also Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1312 (2003) (“[G]roups cultivate a 
special social identity. This identity often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to behave against 
their self-interest, solidifies loyalty, and facilitates harm against nonmembers.”). 
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behaviors.”78 Identity theory focuses particularly on roles people adopt: “In 
identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as an 
occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and 
expectations associated with that role and its performance.”79 So, for 
example, a person might identify as a “doctor,” “spouse,” “parent,” and 
“American.” When the person adopts and internalizes the cultural 
meanings and expectations associated with these roles, they become role 
identities.80 
Role identities can overlap with group identities: for example, when a 
person identifies oneself as “American,” that category may include both a 
group identity and a role identity. At the group level, the person is a 
member of a shared ingroup that excludes others (noncitizens). But the 
“American” or “citizen” identity can also be a role identity that guides 
individual behavior in choosing which political candidate to support, 
whether to vote in favor of a tax levy, or whether to participate in a 
political protest.81 Thus, a person may express an American social identity 
when they talk about “who we are” (or, from the other side, what it means 
to be “un-American”). That same person may perform an American role 
identity in choosing to vote for a particular candidate; the action of voting 
represents an individual action (“a hushed and private choice”) that shapes 
the country’s future.82 Finally, performance of an American role identity 
through individual political participation can influence the meanings of the 
American social identity; as author and commentator Rachel Maddow has 
argued, it is only when public participation ultimately influences national 
policy choices that the public retains control over “who we are as a 
country.”83 
The individual’s “identity standard” contains the meanings that the 
person associates with the identity.84 Thus, while individuals will have 
 
78. Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry & Katherine M. White, A Tale of Two Theories: A 
Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 255, 255 
(1995). 
79. Jan E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. 
Q. 224, 225 (2000). 
80. Id. 
81. BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 122–23 (“[W]hen one identifies with a group, the 
identification may not only be on the basis of a social category but also be on the basis of being a 
particular role-holder.”). 
82. See Lisa Belkin, Teaching Children How to Vote, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE BLOG (Nov. 3, 
2010, 1:38 PM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/teaching-children-how-to-vote/ 
(“When I was 3 or 4, my father took me into the voting booth for the first time. . . . it was a ritual, that 
visit to the voting booth—closing the curtain, making a hushed and private choice, snapping the curtain 
open again.”). 
83. RACHEL MADDOW, DRIFT: THE UNMOORING OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER 7 (2012). 
84. Jan E. Stets & Michael J. Carter, A Theory of the Self for the Sociology of Morality, 77 AM. 
SOC. REV. 120, 124 (2012). 
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different ideas about what it means to be a doctor or to be a parent, each of 
these terms still has certain meanings and expectations that are shared 
within the larger culture.85 There is broad agreement, for example, that a 
“moral identity” will include meanings of “justice” and “care.” For some 
people, though not for all, a moral identity may also include meanings of 
“purity,” “loyalty,” or “respect.”86 Role and group identities may be related 
by shared meanings; in the social identity, the focus is on what “we” 
believe or value, while in the role identity, the focus is on what “I” believe 
or value—but in both, the object may be the same.87 
Identities are reinforced through a process called “self-verification,” in 
which people attempt “to confirm what they already believe about 
themselves.”88 Individuals compare their own identity standards to the 
evaluations of themselves that are made by others. They see themselves 
reflected in the eyes of others, and they compare this reflected self-
assessment to their own ideas of who they are. When the reflected feedback 
matches their own identity standards, they have obtained “self-
verification,” and they experience positive emotions.89 Conversely, when 
the reflected feedback does not match their identity standards, people 
experience emotional distress.90 
B. Due Process in Identity Structures 
Both identity theory and social identity theory may help explain the 
shifting role of due process in American foreign relations in the so-called 
war on terror. In particular, social identity theory helps to explain how we 
 
85. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 
(2009); Lynn Mather, Presidential Address: Reflections on the Reach of Law (and Society) Post 9/11: 
An American Superhero?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 263, 276–277 (describing the cultural meanings 
associated with the role of “lawyer” at different times: “Law works through its cultural practices and 
images, as well as through its institutional forms and social processes. . . . The image of Perry Mason 
has given way to one of an attorney general filing suit on behalf of an entire state or a wealthy plaintiff 
lawyer filing a class action . . . .”). 
86. Stets & Carter, supra note 84, at 124. 
87. Robertson, supra note 13, at 395 (“For example, the meaning of being a member of the 
Republican party and a lawyer within the Republican administration involved sharing the common 
meaning of ‘fighting terrorism.’”). 
88. BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 59. 
89. Id. at 76. 
90. Stets & Carter, supra note 84, at 125. The distress resulting from a failure to verify one’s 
identity is annually experienced in law school when students obtain their first-year grades. Because 
most law students have achieved strong academic success in the past, they have typically developed a 
strong identity tied to academic success. When some law students obtain lower grades than they are 
used to, the greatest source of emotional distress may not relate to fears about employability or other 
future prospects; instead, it arises from the disconnect between identity and reflected assessment. Thus, 
when a self-identified “A-level student” receives a B on an exam, the student may experience anger, 
depression, and general distress. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Organizational Management of 
Conflicting Professional Identities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (2011). 
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define who we believe should be entitled to due process, and identity 
theory helps to explain when we, as individuals, decide to support policies 
that extend or retract a due process framework. 
1. Social Identity 
The process of social identity may be easier to understand: the “us vs. 
them” mentality is a common construct.91 The tragic events of September 
11, 2001, reshaped—at least for a time—the dominant ingroup and 
outgroup.92 Instead of dividing along racial, political, or economic lines, the 
country united in an “American” identity. The outgroup, however, proved 
harder to define: for some, it was “al-Qaida”; for others, it was “terrorists” 
in general; for still others, it was “Arabs,” “Middle Easterners,” or 
“Muslims.” In some cases, these distinctions were blurred.93 
A broadly defined outgroup makes it easier to refuse due process 
protections to individuals targeted in the war on terror. First, to the extent 
that due process is viewed as part of “us” or “who we are,” a broader 
definition of “them” or “who we are not” makes it easier to limit due 
process protections only to a narrow ingroup. Second, a broadly defined 
outgroup makes it easier to conflate characteristics such as race, religion, or 
nationality with terrorism or crime.94 The purpose of due process itself is to 
distinguish between guilt and innocence; refusing to extend due process to 
those presumed guilty risks recreating the witchhunts of the colonial era, in 
which “[m]en feared witches and burnt women.”95 
Thus, as described in Part I, even though due process may be a 
fundamental part of the American identity, social identity theory can 
explain why, in some cases, people do not want to extend due process to 
 
91. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1082 (2003) (“Counterterrorism measures and emergency powers 
are often perceived as directed against a clear enemy of ‘others.’ . . . One is either with ‘us’ or with 
‘them.’ There is no middle way.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 
1592 (2002) (“The shift in perceptions of racial profiling is clearly grounded in the fact that those 
individuals who are being profiled are not considered to be part of ‘us.’”). 
92. Lenese C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 150 (2003). 
93. Bram van Heuveln, Letter to the Editor, Think, Analyze and Then Decide, ALBANY TIMES 
UNION, Aug. 23, 2010, available at http://web.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?newsdate= 
5/18/2011&navigation=nextprior&category=OPINION&storyID=962703 (concluding that opposition 
to building a mosque near Ground Zero makes sense only if opponents believe that “[m]osque equals 
Muslims equals Islam equals al-Qaida equals Taliban equals terrorists”). 
94. Daniel Kanstroom, Reaping the Harvest: The Long, Complicated, Crucial Rhetorical Struggle 
over Deportation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (2007) (noting that in the aftermath of 9/11, “legal 
permanent residents [were] targeted for all sorts of problematic reasons: race, national origin, political 
opinions, religion, etc.”). 
95. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
2 ROBERTSON 255 - 288 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2012  2:42 PM 
2012] Due Process in the American Identity 273 
the outgroup.96 For example, the political advocacy organization Keep 
America Safe makes the denial of a due process framework part of its 
mission, proclaiming that “by treating terrorism as a law enforcement 
matter, giving foreign terrorists the same rights as American 
citizens, . . . the current administration is weakening the nation, and making 
it more difficult for us to defend our security and our interests.”97 Liz 
Cheney, daughter of former Vice President Dick Cheney and founder of 
Keep America Safe, has repeatedly argued against due process protections 
in the trials of suspected terrorists. After evidence in a civilian trial against 
Ahmed Ghailani was excluded because it derived from “the testimony of a 
witness whom the government obtained only through information it 
allegedly extracted by physical and psychological abuse of the 
defendant,”98 Cheney issued a statement decrying the idea that “al Qaeda 
terrorists” would get “the kind of due process rights normally reserved for 
American citizens.”99 She argued that “insisting on trying Ahmed Ghailani 
in civilian court with full constitutional rights,” had “jeopardize[ed] the 
prosecution of a terrorist” and was therefore “irresponsible and reckless.”100 
Cheney’s statement combines the concepts of social identity and due 
process in several ways. First, though her statement seems to account for 
both an expressive view of due process and a utilitarian one, she is 
ultimately prioritizing the expressive view; Ghailani’s subsequent 
conviction did not change her view that civilian courts were an 
inappropriate forum. This expressive view of due process is closely aligned 
with group identity.101 Although Cheney contrasts “due process” with 
“security,” she is not making a cost–benefit calculation of the benefits of 
either approach as a policy matter; instead, she is discussing due process as 
a value and attaching that value to a social identity. Her statement 
articulates the idea that due process is something for “us” but not for 
“them.” But who is “them”? 
When Cheney refers to the prosecution of “a terrorist,” she seems to be 
limiting the outgroup just to the nation’s declared enemies—or at least, 
since the trial had not yet reached a conclusion, to those accused by the 
executive branch of engaging in terrorism. But when she refers to “the kind 
of due process rights normally reserved for American citizens,” she appears 
 
96. See supra Part I. 
97. Mission Statement, KEEP AMERICA SAFE, http://www.keepamericasafe.com/?page_id=217 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
98. United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
99. John McCormack, Liz Cheney Reacts to Delay of Ghailani Trial, WKLY. STANDARD (Oct. 6, 
2010, 5:54 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/liz-cheney-reacts-delay-ghailani-
trial_501028.html. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra Part I; see also Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1286 
(2011) (linking social identity theory with an expressive function of law). 
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to be making a broader distinction; in this instance, the outgroup not 
entitled to due process may be any noncitizen.102 Finally, the context of her 
statement—the decision to exclude testimony gained through coercive 
interrogation—also suggests that her restriction on due process would 
allow coercive interrogation against members of the outgroup. 
While Cheney’s position is highly controversial even among those 
otherwise politically aligned with her,103 she is not alone: Senator Scott 
Brown expressed a similar sentiment when he asserted that “[i]n dealing 
with terrorists, our tax dollars should pay for weapons to stop them, not 
lawyers to defend them.”104 Again, the focus on “our” tax dollars 
emphasizes a shared ingroup that deserves due process, in contrast to the 
terrorist outgroup that should not have “lawyers to defend them.” These 
statements highlight how social identity can encourage support for 
limitations on due process. By emphasizing a shared identity in the war on 
terror and broadly defining the outgroup in a way that merges “terrorist” 
with “noncitizen,” it becomes much easier to justify limitations on 
traditional due process protections. And such statements are not limited to 
politicians; lawyers have used similar rhetoric in legal scholarship 
advocating for the use of military tribunals rather than civilian courts in 
terrorism cases, arguing that “our” Bill of Rights was not intended to 
protect those who engage in terrorism.105 
Thus, a broad definition of the outgroup—even, perhaps, an 
unconsciously broad definition of the outgroup that conflates race or 
 
102. It is also possible, of course, that Cheney has not consciously defined the outgroup, and may 
be unconsciously linking race, religion, and/or nationality in the outgroup characterization. See supra 
note 93; see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1698 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he neo-Orientalist formation of the 
‘Muslim-looking’ category in the aftermath of September 11 helped to make Guantánamo not only 
possible, but necessary.”); Jasbir K. Puar & Amit S. Rai, Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on 
Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots, 72 SOC. TEXT 117, 126 (2002) (noting that in the 
aftermath of 9/11, some Americans associated Osama Bin Laden with Apu, a South Asian convenience 
store owner and character on the Simpson television show). 
103. John Schwartz, Conservatives Split Deeply over Attacks on Justice Dep’t Lawyers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A1. 
104. David J. R. Frakt, Lawfare and Counterlawfare: The Demonization of the Gitmo Bar and 
Other Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 335 (2010) (quoting 
Senator Scott Brown, U.S. Senator, Special Election Victory Speech (Jan. 10, 2010), available at Scott 
Brown’s Victory Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/ 
20text-brown.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). 
105. Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A 
New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349, 405 (1996) (“Our Bill 
of Rights was designed to protect individuals in society against the arbitrary exercise of government 
power. It is not meant to protect commando groups warring on society through arbitrary acts of mass 
violence.”); see also Daniel M. Filler, Values We Can Afford—Protecting Constitutional Rights in an 
Age of Terrorism: A Response to Crona and Richardson, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 409, 412 (1996) 
(criticizing Crona and Richardson’s arguments and noting that their claim is at some level “purely 
normative,” as even if their utilitarian concerns could be mitigated, they “would nonetheless deny these 
suspects the full panoply of criminal procedural rights”). 
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religion with terrorism—can make it easier to justify a refusal to extend 
due process rights. And indeed, this is what many argue happened at 
Guantánamo, where “detainees were assigned the ‘terrorist’ or ‘enemy’ 
label without any semblance of what is generally considered a pinnacle of 
Western and international due process rights—the presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty.”106 In fact, U.S. military analysts have noted 
that up to 20% of the detainees may have been innocent civilians caught up 
by mistake.107 
Interestingly, this rhetorical move was perhaps made easier by a 
political reality not immediately related to the terrorist threat: specifically, 
the fall of Communism and the end of an Eastern bloc “other.” During the 
Cold War, democratic processes (including judicial process) were an 
especially important part of the American social identity; thus, “‘the 
foreign’ sometimes stood as a negative exemplar prompting descriptions of 
‘American’ democratic precepts that refused to condone custodial practices 
identified with despotic regimes.”108 By 2001, however, Communism was 
no longer perceived as the relevant outgroup; instead, terrorist regimes with 
roots in the Middle East were perceived as the new “other.” As a result, due 
process protection of the individual against the state was no longer the 
salient difference between “us” and “them”; instead, freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, and women’s rights took on greater salience as the 
relevant political comparators, while democratic and judicial institutions 
took on lesser salience.109 
 
106. SHADI MOKHTARI, AFTER ABU GHRAIB: EXPLORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA AND THE 
MIDDLE EAST 55 (2009). 
107. Wikileaks: Many at Guantanamo ‘Not Dangerous,’ BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011, 5:06 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13184845 (noting that “assessments of all 780 people ever 
held at the facility” reveal that “US military analysts considered only 220 of those ever detained at 
Guantanamo to be dangerous extremists”; “[a]nother 380 detainees were deemed to be low-ranking 
guerrillas”; and “[a]t least 150 people were revealed to be innocent Afghans or Pakistanis—including 
drivers, farmers and chefs—rounded up during intelligence gathering operations in the aftermath of 
9/11”). 
108. Resnik, supra note 32, at 679; Mary L. Dudziak, Law, Modernization, and the Question of 
Agency in American Legal History, 40 TULSA L. REV. 591, 596 (2005); see also United States v. 
Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We in this country, however, early made 
the choice—that the dignity and privacy of the individual were worth more to society than an all-
powerful police.”); Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law 
applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet 
procedural practices.”). 
109. See, e.g., Aminah B. McCloud, American Muslim Women and U.S. Society, 12 J.L. & 
RELIGION 51, 56 (1996) (“With Islam perceived as a threatening enemy, values that express the core of 
American justice—neutrality, pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, equal protection 
under the law, as examples—are denied to many Muslim women.”); Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan 
Meyer, “Legal Jihad”: How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 395, 410 (2009) (“The reality is that the Muslim community has nothing to gain from 
supporting the censorship of debate about Islam. . . . [Moreover,] [t]he actions of CAIR and the CIC and 
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Finally, it is possible that individuals’ policy choices are based on a 
narrower conception of the ingroup.110 For many, the relevant ingroup may 
be a political party or movement rather than the country as a whole: the 
social identity may be “Democrat,” “Republican,” “conservative,” 
“liberal,” or “progressive.” Thus, for example, at the time of the 2008 
election, there appeared to be a significant partisan split in defining the 
American identity. This difference was reflected in opinion polling at the 
time, as 66% of Republicans versus 33% of Democrats reported a belief 
that “torture was at least sometimes justifiable.”111 In the last four years, 
however, there appears to be less of a partisan split; even self-defined 
liberal Democrats have moved closer to supporting broad executive power 
in the war on terror.112 This narrowing may reflect a sense that the 
dominant political leaders of both parties have moved closer together in 
this area. As others have noted, “once the policy becomes the hallmark of 
both political parties, then public opinion becomes robust in support of 
it. . . . [P]olicies that enjoy the status of bipartisan consensus are removed 
from the realm of mainstream challenge.”113 The shifting positions of 
partisan leaders could very well influence group members’ support of these 
policy choices. 
2. Role Identity 
Like social identity, role identity can also influence how individuals 
think about due process and national security. Individuals perform an 
“American” or “citizen” role identity when they participate in the United 
States democratic process—for example, by making decisions about which 
candidates to support, by debating friends and colleagues about policy 
choices, or by answering political polling questions. This role identity is 
 
others who engage in Islamist lawfare offer a great rebuttal to those who see Islamism as compatible 
with democracy.”). 
110. Indeed, people will sometimes narrowly define the relevant ingroup to avoid the cognitive 
dissonance that can arise when members of the larger group engage in identity violative behaviors. 
Thus, for example, the focus on two individual perpetrators of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib “reinforces 
the official response that the events at Abu Ghraib were aberrational and do not represent America,” 
and although “the American faces in the Abu Ghraib pictures may look like ours, the representation of 
[the individuals] allow[] many Americans to use class, geography, lifestyle, and education to distance 
themselves from torture and abuse.” Robert N. Strassfeld, American Innocence, 37 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 277, 305 (2006). 
111. See Robertson, supra note 13, at 399. 
112. Scott Wilson & Jon Cohen, Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama’s Counterterrorism 
Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at A6 (“[A 2012] poll shows that 53 percent of self-identified 
liberal Democrats—and 67 percent of moderate or conservative Democrats—support keeping 
Guantanamo Bay open, even though it emerged as a symbol of the post-Sept. 11 national security 
policies of President George W. Bush, which many liberals bitterly opposed.”). 
113. Glen Greenwald, Repulsive Progressive Hypocrisy, SALON (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:13 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/02/08/repulsive_progressive_hypocrisy/singleton/. 
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likely to be activated any time individuals deliberate over matters of public 
policy and public choice. Of course, many individuals do not deliberate 
over policy matters at all; the limited impact of an individual vote may 
create an incentive to be “rationally ignorant.”114 Nevertheless, people 
participate in political activities more than a rational-ignorance theory 
suggests that they ought to; it may well be that the activation of the 
“citizen” identity and a desire to verify that identity can offset the incentive 
towards rational ignorance.115 
As noted above, the identity standard for a role identity includes 
various culturally agreed-upon meanings.116 As other scholars have pointed 
out, the American identity has more than one meaning, and its meanings 
may, at times, conflict with each other.117 On the one hand, the value of due 
process is central to the American identity; due process has been 
characterized by President Obama as “the essence of who we are,”118 and 
Senator McCain made a similar point in the 2008 Republican primary 
debate, where he condemned torture by stating that his experience in 
Vietnam had convinced him “[i]t’s not about the terrorists; it’s about us. 
It’s about what kind of country we are.”119 Even a group of high-school 
student leaders linked identity to political policy when they wrote a note to 
President Bush during a White House visit stating, “we have been told that 
we represent the best and brightest of our nation. Therefore, we believe we 
have a responsibility to voice our convictions. We do not want America to 
represent torture.”120 
But although “respect for due process” is one meaning in the American 
identity, it is not the only one: the American identity also includes a “focus 
 
114. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1211 (2007) (“The acquisition of political information is a classic collective action 
problem, a situation in which a good (here, an informed electorate) is undersupplied because any one 
individual’s possible contribution to its production is insignificant. And those who do not contribute 
will still get to enjoy the benefits of the good if it is successfully provided through the efforts of 
others.”). 
115. See supra Part II.A. 
116. BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 114–15 (citation omitted) (“Individuals are socialized 
into what it means to be a student, friend, or worker. Importantly, they learn the meanings of a role 
identity in interaction with others in which others act toward the self as if the person had the identity 
appropriate to their role behavior. In this way, role identities acquire meaning through the reactions of 
others.”). 
117. Brent J. Steele, ‘Ideals that Were Really Never in Our Possession’: Torture, Honor, and US 
Identity, 22 INT’L REL. 243, 248 (2008), available at http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/22/2/243.pdf. 
118. Ruth Marcus, Court Appointments Critical to Election, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 
19, 2008, at B6. 
119. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: SECRET GOVERNMENT, WAR 
CRIMES, AND THE RULE OF LAW 152 (2009). 
120. MOKHTARI, supra note 106, at 242. 
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upon strength [and] will.”121 The “strength and will” part of the American 
identity may conflict with the “justice” or “due process” part of the 
identity.122 The events of 9/11 put these two meanings squarely into 
conflict: the terrorist act on American soil caused fear amid the destruction, 
and directly countered America’s sense of strength with a realization of 
vulnerability.123 Thus, it is not surprising that individuals would need to 
regain a sense of strength in order to achieve self-verification of their 
American identity, and supporting harsh counterterror measures was one 
way in which Americans could assert strength. This dynamic played out 
especially in popular culture, with country song lyrics promising “[Y]ou’ll 
be sorry that you messed with the USofA, ‘Cuz we’ll put a boot in your ass, 
It’s the American Way”;124 t-shirts with a surf design proclaiming “I’d 
rather be waterboarding”;125 and television shows such as 24 that regularly 
depicted heroic American figures engaging in torture.126 
This tension between “strength/will” and “due process/justice” in the 
American identity can create a conflict for individuals, and may lead to a 
change in the identity standard in order to reconcile this conflict.127 Identity 
theory suggests that commitment (the more “ties to others because of an 
identity”) and salience (a higher likelihood of identity activation, with more 
“occasions making demands to have particular meanings portrayed”) will 
 
121. Brent J. Steele, supra note 117, at 248 (quoting Jutta Weldes, The Cultural Production of 
Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba, in CULTURES OF INSECURITY: STATES, COMMUNITIES AND 
THE PRODUCTION OF DANGER 46 (J. Weldes et al. eds., 1992)). 
122. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Interrogation of Detainees: Extending A Hand or A Boot?, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 375 (2008). 
123. See, e.g., David Crumm, Editorial, Unfinished Business: At the Height of America’s Power, 
We Are Learning to Live with Anxiety over Our Surprising Vulnerability, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 
11, 2003, at 1A (“Our image of ourselves as fortress America ended that day . . . .”). 
124. See Guiora, supra note 122, at 375 (citing Toby Keith, Angry American (Courtesy of the Red 
White and Blue), on UNLEASHED (Dreamworks Nashville 2002)) (contrasting “an ethical commitment 
to the norms of civil society,” with “an attitude analogous to Toby Keith’s ‘American Way’”). 
125. See Robertson, supra note 13, at 399 n.52 (“In the fall of 2009, t-shirts reading ‘I’d rather be 
waterboarding’ were offered for sale by Conservative T-Shirts.com, alongside other shirts stating 
‘Proud Republican,’ ‘Jesus Christ is a Personal Friend of Mine,’ and ‘Annoy a Liberal: Work Hard and 
Live Free.’”). 
126. See Sam Kamin, How the War on Terror May Affect Domestic Interrogations: The 24 Effect, 
10 CHAP. L. REV. 693, 705 n.49 (2007) (“Fox’s ‘24’ showed 67 scenes of torture in the first five 
seasons. Upon review of prime time broadcast programming from 1995 to 2001, there were 110 scenes 
of torture. From 2002 to 2005, the number increased to 624 scenes of torture.”); id. at 707 n.58 
(describing scenes in which “Jack shoots a woman suspected of having information about a bomb in the 
arm and then refuses to give her pain medication until she divulges the information about the location of 
a bomb, which again, she does”; “Jack breaks a suspect’s fingers, one by one, to get him to release the 
whereabouts of another suspected terrorist”; “Jack uses a cigar cutter to cut off the tip of a suspect’s 
pinky, and the suspect then states that a terrorist is in the Mojave Desert preparing to launch aerial 
drones to deliver nuclear warheads.”). 
127. See BURKE & STETS, supra note 69, at 183–84 (providing an example where the role 
identities of “woman” and “wife” may come into conflict and thereby lead to “some level of distress 
because of the discrepancies,” ultimately causing “the identity standards for both her identities [to] shift 
slowly toward each other, becoming identical at some ‘compromise’ position”). 
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influence the direction of change in the identity standard.128 Thus, when the 
“strength” meaning appears more prevalent in the media, in politics, and 
among the individual’s friends, the tension between the “due process” and 
“strength” aspects of individual’s identity may be resolved closer to the 
“strength” part of the continuum. Because of the prominence of the 
“strength” meaning in daily life, the individual finds it easier to achieve 
identity verification through the support of policy choices that emphasize 
American strength and might. 
This shift in the identity standard is likely to happen at an unconscious 
level, leaving people unaware that they are adjusting their ideas about what 
it means to be American. When a conflict between a person’s identity 
standard and reflected assessment arises, a person may bridge that gap 
through strategies that are either “overt/behavioral” or 
“covert/cognitive.”129 Overt/behavioral strategies are conscious ones; for 
example, a person might intentionally decide to affiliate with others who 
share the individual’s identity, increasing the opportunities for self-
verification (thus, for example, a person who joins the military would find 
it easier to verify the “strength” aspect of the American identity). Covert 
strategies, on the other hand, operate at an unconscious level, as the 
individual engages in selective attention (“self-verifying information is 
given attention and processed, and information that is not self-confirming is 
ignored”) and selective interpretation (“endorsing feedback that fits self-
views and denying feedback that does not fit self-views”).130 The large 
percentage of Americans who have grown to support counterterrorism 
measures such as drone strikes and indefinite detention may well have 
unconsciously moved away from a “due process/justice” identity and 
toward a “strength/will” identity. 
III. REFRAMING THE PUBLIC DIALOGUE 
A shift in public support for policies such as targeted killing, indefinite 
detention, and enhanced interrogation cannot be explained by morality, 
legality, or efficacy alone. Each of these factors combines with individuals’ 
identities and ideas about what it means to be an American. Recognizing 
this complexity and adopting a more nuanced view of due process in the 
American identity can facilitate public dialogue about policy choices in the 
war on terror. Ultimately, public dialogue on due process and national 
security needs to account for values and identity as well as legal doctrine. 
 
128. Id. at 184. 
129. Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity Theory 
Perspective, 50 SOC. PERSP. 517, 522–23 (2007). 
130. Id. at 522; see also Robertson, supra note 85,at 18. 
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This Part begins such a discussion. It first examines how constitutional 
due process can serve as a legal baseline, protecting against efforts to 
withhold basic legal rights from those perceived to be our enemies. It then 
explores arguments for extending due process rights beyond those 
minimum requirements and recommends expanding public discussion 
beyond the legality of the policies—or even their instrumental value—and 
moving the discussion into an examination of more fundamental questions 
of national identity. 
A. Constitutional Due Process as a Baseline 
This Article has asserted that legality alone is not a sufficient basis on 
which to make policy choices about the desirability of various 
counterterrorism policies. But while legality alone is insufficient, it is still 
important. At the most basic level, the legal doctrine of constitutional due 
process protects against a desire to withhold legal protections from those 
perceived to be enemies.131 The Constitution protects due process rights 
even in the absence of a political will to do so.132 
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recently reaffirmed this protection 
in strong terms, stating that  
“[w]hatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or 
modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and 
application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war 
and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to 
accommodate it.”133  
Thus, constitutional due process does not permit withholding process 
from suspected terrorists, even if some might wish to do so; instead, it 
requires a real analysis of the actual threat to national security. Politicians 
and commentators who decry the extension of “our due process”134 to 
terrorists may be displeased, but the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the 
 
131. See Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1065 (2005) (noting that there is no evidence of the Supreme Court’s “willingness to 
assume a co-equal role in the war on terrorism,” but that the Court’s detainee jurisdiction is “best 
understood as a reminder to the President and Congress that they need to ensure that there is some 
process to address individual concerns. Due process being flexible, that process will necessarily vary 
depending on the circumstances.”). 
132. Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 470 (2003) 
(“The rule of law becomes more vital, not less so, when democracy is attacked.”). 
133. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004). 
134. See Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals, supra note 56, at 29. 
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existence of a constitutional baseline that the war on terror has not 
abrogated.135 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s view of procedural due process is 
not absolute. Instead, it is fundamentally consequentialist;136 the question 
of “what process is due” turns heavily on the costs and benefits of 
extending that process.137 As a result, individual justices do not always 
agree about how to measure the benefits of extending process or how to 
measure the potential threats to national security. For example, when the 
Court took a due process approach to indefinite detention in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court’s conclusion and would 
have weighed the potential costs more strongly.138 He wrote that although 
“Hamdi has been deprived of a serious interest, one actually protected by 
the Due Process Clause,” that deprivation must be measured against “the 
Government’s overriding interest in protecting the Nation.”139 
The consequentialist focus also makes it easier for individuals to talk 
past each other in a policy debate about due process in the war on terror. 
Observers sometimes make what is essentially a deontological argument, 
even while wrapping it in the trappings of a consequentialist due process 
perspective. As one scholar has noted, a number of those who have 
objected to the legality of targeted killing “lack proof for their claims about 
the legal, diplomatic and strategic results of drone strikes.”140 For such 
objectors, empirical evidence of the result of drone strikes may be beside 
the point; their objections may be founded on deontological grounds rather 
than purely consequentialist ones. Defining what is meant by “due process” 
in a particular argument—whether it be a consequentialist or deontological 
 
135. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An 
Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 392 (2010) (“In the War on Terror cases 
decided so far, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld petitioners’ claims of rights to fair procedures, 
including judicial review of executive branch decisions to classify detainees as enemy combatants.”). 
136. While the Court’s view has been fundamentally consequentialist, scholars have noted that 
there may still be deontological restraints on the due process balancing test. See Solum, supra note 42, 
at 257–59, 321 (“We can easily rationalize the sacrifice of procedural justice from a consequentialist 
perspective . . . . In the end, however, these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure without justice 
sacrifices legitimacy.”). And still others have argued that the deontological values of dignity and 
legitimacy represent the ultimate goal of procedural fairness. Martinez, supra note 22, at 1084 (2008) 
(“A leading competitor to the utilitarian procedure-as-efficient-application-of-substantive-law theory 
outlined above gives more weight to the dignitary, legitimacy-conferring aspects of procedure.”). Of 
course, substantive due process, while beyond the scope of this Article, may well have a basis in 
deontological philosophy. See Walter C. Long, Appeasing a God: Rawlsian Analysis of Herrera v. 
Collins and a Substantive Due Process Right to Innocent Life, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 219 (1994). 
137. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
138. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 598 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. 
140. Gregory S. McNeal, Are Targeted Killings Unlawful? A Case Study in Empirical Claims 
Without Empirical Evidence, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL 
WORLD 326, 346 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, & Andrew Altman, eds. 2012). 
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conception, and whether the argument is founded on questions of legality 
or identity—can help clarify the contours of the debate. 
B. Policy Choices Above Baseline Due Process 
Clarifying the terms of the policy debate means that analysis of 
constitutional due process as a legal matter is only the beginning; we also 
need to consider questions of values and identity in deciding what process 
is due. The Constitution’s view of procedural due process creates a floor, 
not a ceiling; a heightened level of due process that exceeds constitutional 
requirements may be awarded when there is the political will to support 
it.141 
1. Procedural Mechanisms for Heightening Due Process 
What would a heightened level of due process look like? First—and 
contrary to Liz Cheney’s position—it would involve not just extending, but 
also expanding the due process protections offered to people suspected of 
terrorism. It may give the courts a greater role in determining the legality of 
targeted killing.142 It may give civilian courts, in particular, a greater role in 
dealing with individuals who have been detained in the war on terror.143 It 
would likely mean that evidence gained from torture would not be 
admissible in court.144 Of course, many people have argued that these 
elements are already part of the baseline due process protection, and indeed 
they may be, but because the legalities are still uncertain, this Article 
recommends that policymakers consider whether due process should be 
heightened as a policy matter regardless of what the law may require. 
 
141. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (noting 
that even though “[a]liens seeking admission to the United States . . . have no constitutional rights with 
regard to their applications” they are provided “limited due process protection” by statute, including a 
right to a hearing before an administrative law judge, a chance to present evidence, and a chance to 
appeal an adverse finding). 
142. Benjamin McKelvey, Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected 
Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 
1380 (2011) (“[A] FISA-style court is a potentially effective possibility because it would provide ex 
ante review of targeted killing orders, and the pre-killing stage is the only stage during which judicial 
review would be meaningful.”); see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(dismissing on political question grounds a lawsuit brought by the father of Anwar al-Awlaqi seeking to 
prevent the United States from targeting him for execution). 
143. Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power to 
Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1270 (2007) (“Detention of non-POW 
enemy combatants for the period of an entire war, especially the wholly indeterminate war on terror, 
without a criminal trial is a deprivation of a liberty interest that requires some due process.”) (statement 
by Professor Choper). 
144. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture 
Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129 (2008). 
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Some have argued that heightened due process could rely on executive 
branch procedures rather than the judiciary. As Attorney General Holder 
has noted, “‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, 
particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees 
due process, not judicial process.”145 Additionally, some scholars have 
suggested that targeted killings may comport with due process as long as 
the executive branch conducts an “independent, impartial, prompt, and 
(presumptively) public investigation of its legality.”146 While Holder and 
other scholars may be right as a matter of constitutional law, they are not 
accounting for the fact that many citizens do indeed equate “due process” 
with “judicial process”147—the idea “that law, in an intensely legalistic 
society, [is] enough.”148 To the extent that the nation relies on executive-
level due process, it will have to be especially transparent in those 
procedures to persuade its citizens that their country still embraces due 
process values.149 Thus, publicly available guidelines and procedures are 
important,150 and it is also important that legal counsel is kept in the loop 
on the decision-making process—even if some of the lawyers offer a view 
that restricts executive power.151 
Equally as important as transparency is a willingness to follow through 
on policy decisions. When stated policy positions are not carried over into 
the legal realm, observers may doubt the sincerity of those positions. Thus, 
for example, President Obama has been criticized for “publicly assert[ing] 
that waterboarding was torture but then refus[ing] to take any criminal 
action against those who authorized or carried out the technique.”152 While 
this reluctance may stem from a desire to move forward rather than to re-
fight the partisan battles of the last decade, this failure to address perceived 
violations sends a message that supporting the rule of law is not the 
country’s top priority. As a result, this “[f]ailure to seek real 
 
145. Holder, supra note 59. 
146. See Murphy & Radsan, Due Process, supra note 24, at 446. 
147. See Schneider, supra note 38. 
148. Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 61, at 471. 
149. See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 56 (2011) (“Fair methods are 
generally ones that are open to public scrutiny—they conform to what I have called ‘the principle of 
visibleness.’”). 
150. Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for 
CIA Targeted Killing, 2011 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (2011) (“To enhance accountability, the IG 
could prepare public reports detailing as much information on strikes as reasonably consonant with 
national security.”). 
151. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 182–83 
(2010) (noting that the State Department Legal Adviser was excluded from the Bush Administration’s 
War Council). 
152. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, and 
Associated Forces—the First Year, 30 PACE L. REV. 340, 361 (2010). 
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accountability . . . undermines the United States’ position as a champion of 
justice and the rule of law.”153 
2. Advantages of Choosing a Heightened Level of Due Process 
As a policy matter, offering a heightened level of due process may 
have positive effects. First, it better accounts for the true costs and benefits 
of counterterrorism practices, offsetting cognitive biases that affect this 
calculation. Second, it also likely increases the perceived legitimacy of 
U.S. government action—at least when such action does not violate 
individuals’ sense of identity. Finally, heightened due process can also 
reconcile deontological and consequentialist views of due process and 
preserve the centrality of process in the American identity. 
Providing a higher level of due process can guard against cognitive 
biases that cause us to overestimate the risks of events that are catastrophic 
and outside our direct control—two hallmarks of the terrorist threat.154 
First, the risk of a terrorist strike is perceived as a more short-term and 
immediate risk than the potential harm to judicial process in the long run, 
and “in a period of crisis, long-term costs are easily overshadowed by 
perceived short-term gains.”155 Second, the terrorist threat raises existential 
fears—it “threatens to change the way we experience our lives, draining 
meaning from relationships of trust and community, and coloring life with 
the awful hues of suspicion, intimidation, and fear.”156 Thus, we are 
predisposed to misjudge the risk of terrorism in a due process calculus, and 
as a result, “we have all too often” realized only with hindsight that we 
overestimated the potential emergency “after civil liberties have been 
sacrificed at the altar of national security.”157 By maintaining and even 
increasing traditional elements of procedural due process, we may offset 
 
153. David J. R. Frakt, Military Accountability (or the Lack Thereof) for Detainee Abuse: The 
Instructive Case of Mohammed Jawad, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 873, 910 (2011). 
154. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 202 
(2008) (noting that this type of catastrophic threat is “precisely the sort of threat that terror poses”); 
SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 138–39 (1993); Thomas A. 
Lambert, Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response to Professors Feigenson et al. and Professor 
Slovic, 69 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2004) (“[T]he perceived risk levels were orders of magnitude 
greater than actual risk levels—respondents . . . greatly overestimated the actual risk of both 
occurrences (SARS and terrorism).”). 
155. David Welsh, Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment 
of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 261, 294 (2011). 
156. BOBBITT, supra note 154, at 202. 
157. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 49, 68 (2007). 
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this cognitive bias to some degree by forcing a more reasoned analysis of 
long-term risks.158 
In addition to guarding against cognitive bias, heightened due process 
may also increase institutional legitimacy over time. This benefit would not 
be immediate; nevertheless, as Professor Lawrence Solum has noted, even 
a consequentialist approach to due process need not confine itself to a 
calculation of only the most obvious or short-term costs and benefits.159 
Instead, it should account for more far-reaching effects, including political 
legitimacy.160 And a respect for procedural justice, in particular, can 
increase institutional legitimacy; as scholars have noted, “procedural 
fairness plays a key role in shaping the legitimacy that citizens grant to 
government authority.”161 
Institutional legitimacy can have significant value in the fight against 
terrorism.162 When institutions have a high level of political legitimacy, 
they possess “a reservoir of goodwill that allows the institutions of 
government to go against what people may want at the moment without 
suffering debilitating consequences.”163 Without this reservoir, 
governments must spend additional resources to monitor compliance and to 
create incentives for desired behavior.164 But with such a reservoir, it is 
easier to encourage global cooperation in specific counterterrorism 
initiatives and to foster “the development of international legal norms 
against terrorism.”165 
This legitimacy benefit only accrues when procedures comport with 
identity, however.166 It has long been noted that fair procedures can 
improve participants’ reactions to decisional outcomes—that is, even when 
 
158. Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 355 (2009) (arguing that a commitment to due process can “liberate 
counterterrorism policy from the rigidities that inevitably plague partisan-political reactions to national-
security emergencies”). Ensuring due process protections for public officials involved in national-
security decision making is similarly important; just as cognitive biases may cause people to 
overestimate the risks of the terrorist threat, so too may hindsight bias cause people to judge officials’ 
decisions more harshly in retrospect than is warranted. See Margulies, supra note 24, at 210-18. 
159. Solum, supra note 42, at 183. 
160. Id. (noting that due process is “an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-
guiding legal norms”). 
161. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of 
Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 180 (2005). 
162. Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 967, 967 (2009); Welsh, supra note 155, at 294. 
163. JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION? 
289 (2004). 
164. Tom R. Tyler, Pscyhological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. 
PSYCH. 375, 377 (2006). 
165. Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 356 
(2005). 
166. David M. Mayer, Rebecca L. Greenbaum, Maribeth Kuenzi & Garriy Shteynberg, When Do 
Fair Procedures Not Matter? A Test of the Identity Violation Effect, 94 J. APP. PSYCH. 142 (2009). 
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those decisions go against them, the existence of fair procedures minimizes 
people’s negative reaction.167 Recently, however, work in experimental 
psychology has revealed an exception to this “fair process effect”; namely, 
when individuals “have their identity violated by a decision outcome,” they 
“will be motivated to find flaws in the procedure to justify being upset 
about the decision outcome.”168 That is, “if a decision damages a central 
part of an individual (i.e., one’s identity), it is unlikely that providing a 
voice or having consistent procedures can remedy the situation.”169 
This “identity violation effect” suggests that in considering whether to 
increase reliance on traditional mechanisms of judicial due process, we 
should explicitly consider questions of identity. The recent data on public 
opinion may indicate that a majority of Americans do not currently feel that 
counterterrorism policy violates their sense of identity. For some, in fact, 
extending due process to accused terrorists may violate their sense of 
self.170 
But for that portion of the population who opposes such tactics, the 
identity violation effect may come into play when considering executive-
branch alternatives to judicial process. To the extent that extrajudicial 
counterterrorism measures violate some individuals’ sense of what it means 
to be American, it may be impossible to persuade them that alternative 
processes such as military commissions or executive-branch level review of 
targeted killings offer sufficient protection. Indeed, those who oppose such 
procedures often frame their objections in terms of identity, suggesting that 
the identity violation effect is felt at least by a significant minority.171 Even 
without a majority, this group can have a significant impact on public 
policy, especially in influencing others who attach both a “due process” 
and “strength” meaning to the American identity but who have found the 
“strength” meaning to be more salient up till now.172 
As a policy matter, a legal doctrine of due process will be most robust 
when it is informed by sociological realities as well as political realities.173 
Due process serves a truth-seeking function and protects against the abuse 
of governmental power.174 But it also serves a political role “designed to 
engage the litigant qua citizen in an important governmental institution for 
 
167. Id. at 142. 
168. Id. at 144 (citation omitted). 
169. Id. at 159. 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 97–106. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 37–40. 
172. See supra Part II.B.2. 
173. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 239 (1993) (“In the end, law informed by politics is the best 
guarantee of politics informed by law.”). 
174. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005). 
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deciding rights.”175 This political function can only work effectively if our 
due process rights conform to our national identity. 
A fundamental reliance on due process—even to the detriment of 
competing goals such as access to justice—is woven into the fabric of both 
American law and American identity.176 This Article has argued that such 
considerations already run through the public dialogue regarding 
counterterrorism policy, albeit often at an unacknowledged and 
unconscious level.177 Those implicit considerations should be made explicit 
and brought to the forefront of public debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process is a fundamental American value, and it is a value that 
deserves a role in the national debate over security. Perhaps harkening back 
to Immanuel Kant, the protagonists in Real Genius responsible for stopping 
the weapon deployment repeated the catchphrase “It’s a moral 
imperative!”178 In the debate over due process in the war on terror, 
however, commentators have frequently merged the moral view with the 
legal. This blending is understandable; although due process is a legal 
doctrine with consequentialist roots, it is also a deontological value with a 
significant place in the American identity. 
Separating these strands in the public debate on the war on terror can 
facilitate the conscious consideration of our national identity. In turn, this 
explicit recognition of the intertwining of identity and policy can create the 
opportunity to intentionally shape this identity. As Professor (now Legal 
Adviser to the State Department) Harold Koh has noted, “national identities 
are not givens, but rather, socially constructed products of learning, 
knowledge, cultural practices, and ideology.”179 Reinforcing a 
deontological commitment to an identity founded on the rule of law—and 
to judicial process as an expression of that commitment—helps to create 
such a social construction by establishing “a shared cultural belief” that 
people can “take . . . for granted as a necessary and proper aspect of their 
 
175. Id. at 1185. 
176. See Ronald A. Brand, Access-to-Justice Analysis on a Due Process Platform, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 76. “[T]he United States focuses on the ‘due process rights of the defendant,’ while 
the rest of the world focuses on ‘access to justice’—the plaintiff’s right to have his or her day in court.” 
Id. at 79. 
177. See supra Part II. 
178. See supra notes 1, 3; Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1859, 1867 (2000) (explaining that under Kant’s “categorical imperative,” “[i]t is morally 
wrong . . . to fail to respect the absolute moral worth of anyone, including yourself, as a self-
determining rational being, regardless of whether you would allow others to treat you without proper 
respect.”). 
179. See Koh, supra note 33, at 202. 
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society.”180 In order to do so, however, we must broaden the discussion 
beyond the legality of the policies—or even their instrumental value—and 
move the discussion into an examination of more fundamental questions of 
who we are as a nation and who we want to be. 
 
180. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law 26 (Washington 
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-02-07, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012845. 
